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Abstract
Recent work has shown that state-of-the-art mod-
els are highly vulnerable to adversarial perturba-
tions of the input. We propose cowboy, an ap-
proach to detecting and defending against adver-
sarial attacks by using both the discriminator and
generator of a GAN trained on the same dataset.
We show that the discriminator consistently scores
the adversarial samples lower than the real sam-
ples across multiple attacks and datasets. We
provide empirical evidence that adversarial sam-
ples lie outside of the data manifold learned by
the GAN. Based on this, we propose a cleaning
method which uses both the discriminator and
generator of the GAN to project the samples back
onto the data manifold. This cleaning procedure
is independent of the classifier and type of attack
and thus can be deployed in existing systems.
1. Introduction
Recent work on adversarial attacks (Szegedy et al., 2013;
Goodfellow et al., 2014b; Kurakin et al., 2016) has shown
that neural networks are brittle and can easily be confused
by small imperceptible modifications of the input. While
these modifications do not affect human perception, they
cause misclassification of samples in deep-learning models
creating a threat for security and safety.
Current defenses against adversarial samples follow two
lines of work: (1) Modifying the training procedure of the
classifier to make it more robust by either modifying the
training data (adversarial learning (Szegedy et al., 2013;
Goodfellow et al., 2014b)) or blocking gradient pathways
(e.g. defensive distillation (Papernot et al., 2016)) and (2)
removing the adversarial perturbations from the input (Meng
& Chen, 2017; Pouya Samangouei, 2018; Song et al., 2017).
We present cowboy, an approach to detecting and defending
against adversarial samples that is agnostic to the target
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classifier and its training procedure and is independent of
the attack method. We leverage the power of a Generative
Adversarial Network (GAN) (Goodfellow et al., 2014a)
trained only on the real data, and use both the discriminator
and generator to successfully defend against various attacks.
A crucial step towards tackling adversarial samples is the
ability to distinguish them from real samples. We postulate
that adversarial samples lie outside of the data manifold and
that the discriminator can effectively detect this. We test
this hypothesis by conducting experiments using different
attacks (Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow
et al., 2014b), Basic Iterative Method (BIM) (Kurakin et al.,
2016), Virtual Adversary Method (VAM) (Miyato et al.,
2015), Projected Gradient Descent Method (PGDM) (Madry
et al., 2017) and Momentum Iterative Method (MIM) (Dong
et al., 2017)) on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10, and
SVHN datasets and show that the discriminator consistently
scores the adversarial samples lower than the original sam-
ples.
Once detected, the adversarial samples can be cleaned by
projecting them back to the data manifold learned by the
GAN and pushing them to a high scoring region guided by
the score of the discriminator. When the cleaning procedure
is used as a pre-processing step on the samples before given
to the classifier, the accuracy of classification improves from
0.02% to 0.81% for one of the worst attack.
Our main contributions can be summarized as:
• We empirically show that adversarial samples lie out-
side of the data manifold learned by a GAN that has
been trained on the same dataset.
• We propose a simple procedure that uses both the gen-
erator and the discriminator to successfully detect and
clean adversarial samples.
The key feature of our framework is that both the GAN and
classifier are not modified nor are shown adversarial samples
during training. This allows our approach to generalize to
multiple attacks and datasets with only a few lines of code.
This makes our framework an easy to plug-in step in already
deployed classification pipelines
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Necessary
background including various defense mechanisms and at-
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tack models that we use are introduced in Section 2. In
Section 3, we describe and motivate cowboy, a simple, yet
effective defense algorithm. Finally, Section 4 presents and
discusses experimental results for both detection and clean-
ing under different attack methods for generating adversarial
samples across 4 different datasets.
2. Background and Related Work
Attack Strategies. Adversarial samples were first re-
ported by (Szegedy et al., 2013). Since then many attack
strategies have been proposed, which can broadly be clas-
sified into black-box and white-box attacks. White-box
strategies have access to all the weights and gradients of the
classifier. Black-box strategies on the other hand, have ac-
cess only to the predictions of the network. Even though this
might make the attacks more difficult, it enables successful
attacks to be transferable to many classifiers.
In this work, an attack strategy is an algorithm that per-
turbs an original sample X ∈ Rn to an adversarial sample
Xadv = X + δ ∈ Rn in a way that the change is unde-
tectable to the human eye. The change is measured by the
l∞ norm of the perturbation, denoted by . We focus on the
following attack methods:
Fast Gradient Sign Method (Goodfellow et al., 2014b)
The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) generates adver-
sarial images using
Xadv = X +  · sign(5XJ(X, ytrue)),
where  controls the perturbation’s amplitude, with smaller
values creating imperceptible perturbations. This attack
moves all the pixels of the input X in the direction of the
gradient simultaneously. This method is easy to implement
and inexpensive to compute but is easily detected by current
methods.
Basic Iterative Method (Kurakin et al., 2016) Basic It-
erative Method (BIM) is a variant of the FGSM method. It
applies FGSM multiple times with a smaller step size. The
adversarial examples are computed as
Xadv0 = X,X
adv
n+1 = X
adv
n +α·sign(5XJ(Xadvn+1, ytrue)).
In practice, α is smaller when compared to  of FGSM. We
also clip the updates such that the adversarial samples lie
within the -ball of X .
Momentum Iterative Method (Dong et al., 2017) The
Momentum Iterative Method (MIM) is a variant of BIM
that exploits momentum (Qian, 1999) when updating Xadvn .
This results in adversarial samples of superior quality.1
1This method won the first places in NIPS 2017 Non-targeted
Adversarial Attack and Targeted Adversarial Attack competitions.
Projected Gradient Descent Method (Madry et al.,
2017) Projected Gradient Descent Method(PGDM) is an
optimization based attack which finds a point, Xadv, that
lies within the -ball of X such that it minimizes the proba-
bility of the true label ytrue.
Virtual Adversary Method (Miyato et al., 2015) Vir-
tual Adversary Method (VAM) uses Local Distributional
Smoothness (LDS), defined as the negative sensitivity of the
model distribution p(y|x, θ) with respect to the perturbation
of X , measured in terms of KL divergence. It exploits LDS
to find the direction in which the model is most sensitive to
perturbations to generate adversarial samples.
Defense Strategies. Common approaches to defending
against adversarial attacks include training with adversarial
samples (Goodfellow et al., 2014b), modifying the classifier
to make it more robust to attacks (Papernot et al., 2016),
label-smoothing (Warde-Farley & Goodfellow, 2016), as
well as using auxiliary networks to pre-process and clean the
samples (Gu & Rigazio, 2014; Meng & Chen, 2017). In the
context of purifying the samples, a new line of work focuses
on using generative models to detect and defend against
adversarial attacks. Models like RBMs and PixelRNNs (van
den Oord et al., 2016) have been used to varying degrees of
success as well.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) (Goodfellow
et al., 2014a) are an interesting prospect in defending against
adversarial attacks. Even though training GANs is still no-
toriously difficult, there have been successful efforts in this
direction. Defense-GAN (Pouya Samangouei, 2018) uses
the generator in order to sanitize inputs before passing them
to the classifier. APE-GAN (Shen et al., 2017) modifies a
GAN such that the generator learns to clean the adversarial
samples, whereas the discriminator tries to discriminate be-
tween real and adversarial input. While these approaches
focus only on the generative part of the network, we use
both the generator and the discriminator as means to detect-
ing and protecting against attacks. To our best knowledge,
there has not been any prior work on using an unmodified
discriminator for this task.
3. Cowboy
Our goal is twofold: we want to (i) be able to identify
whether an input is adversarial or not, and (ii) clean it from
its adversarial noise if it is. In order to do so, we aim at com-
bining information drawn from two sources, respectively
the generator G and the discriminator D of a GAN trained
on the same dataset as our initial classifier.
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3.1. Classifiers learn discriminative surfaces
As noted in (Goodfellow et al., 2014b), common activa-
tion functions used in Deep Learning like Sigmoid, ReLU
and Tanh are either piece-wise linear or used in regions
where they have linear-like behavior. As a result, classifiers
modeled as DNNs tend to learn hypersurfaces that split the
output space into finitely many disjoint open subspaces. We
can see this clearly in the case of a mixture of two Gaussians
respectively centered at (3, 3) and (−3,−3) and with vari-
ance 1, as shown in Figure 1. It is also interesting to note
that the classifier assigns high probability to regions where
it has never seen samples before, showing that the classi-
fier has no notion of the data manifold. The classifier only
learns a discriminative surface to maximize classification
accuracy.
Figure 1. Linear discriminative surface learned by a classifier on a
Mixture of two Gaussians.
3.2. Adversarial Examples lie outside the Data
Manifold
There has been work (Gong et al., 2017; Song et al., 2017;
Grosse et al., 2017) arguing that adversarial perturbations
result in samples lying outside of the data manifold. Since
the classifier has no knowledge of the manifold, this can
result in misclassification with very high confidence of the
classifier. We can consider this to be akin to testing out-of-
distribution samples, which naturally results in poor test-
time performance. This suggests the use of defense mecha-
nisms involving the support of the real distribution pdata.
3.3. D can detect adversarial attacks
What kind of information of pdata is captured by the dis-
criminator D? Consider the following two claims:
1. There exists 0 < δ  1 such that the support of pdata
is contained in D−1([1− δ, 1]).
2. If x in a real sample, then corrupting it into an adversar-
ial sample x˜ using common adversarial attack methods
would yield D(x˜) 1.
The first of these claims is equivalent to saying that testing
if a sample x is real by asking whether 1− δ ≤ D(x) ≤ 1
would not yield any false negative, which can also be formu-
lated as an absence of mode-collapse for the discriminator
D.
This behaviour can be understood by reasoning about the
dynamics of learning in the GAN’s min-max game:
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) = Ex∼pdata(x)[logD(x)]+
Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))]. (1)
The discriminator has to assign higher scores to regions
around the data points as these are shown as positive exam-
ples and doing otherwise would increase its loss.
We also assess the validity of this assumption empirically
by drawing violin plots of the values of D for a variety of
datasets in Figure 3, which appears to hold true for each
dataset. This allows us to consider claim 1 as being valid,
under the assumption that the discriminator did not undergo
mode collapse.
However, what can be said about false positives for this
test?, i.e., is there a consequent part of the space outside
of the data manifold where D scores high? As argued in
Section 3.1, a classifier tends to only learn discriminative
surfaces in order to maximize classification accuracy, and
hence D might assign high scores to the presence of real
data in regions where it has never seen any sample, either
real or from G. Indeed, this is what seems to happen in
Figure 2.
Therefore, in order to assess whether D scoring low would
give a good proxy for the detection of adversarial samples,
it is both necessary and sufficient to assess the validity of
claim 2, i.e. that an adversarial sample is unlikely to live in
the region of the space outside of the data manifold where
D scores high. Indeed, adversarial examples lie outside the
data manifold (see Section 3.2), and the data manifold is
contained in the region where D scores high.
Similarly as we did for claim 1, we assess the validity of
claim 2 empirically by drawing violin plots of the values of
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Figure 2. Score of the discriminator D of a GAN trained on a
mixture of two Gaussians.
D on a variety of adversarial attacks. Figure 3 shows that
adversarial samples get assigned a low score by D
This demonstrates thatD scoring low provides a good proxy
for the detection of adversarial attacks.
3.4. Estimating a good threshold
The concepts discussed in the previous section are agnostic
w.r.t. which attack is used. This means that if two com-
pletely different attacks generate adversarial samples in the
same region, then scores of D for these samples would be
similar. This implies that we can obtain a good estimate
for the threshold by using any attack method on the trained
classifier. To do this, we can generate adversarial samples2
using an arbitrary attack method (say FGSM) for each (or a
subset) data point in the dataset. A simple threshold could
then be the average discriminator score across all adversarial
samples. Note that although choosing the maximum instead
of the average could be very badly affected by an outlier,
one can also simply choose anLp average ((1/p)
∑
(·)p)1/p
for some p ∈ [1,∞) as a way to interpolate between the
average and the maximum.
3.5. Taming Adversarial Samples
Once an input has been detected as adversarial, we can
attempt to clean this input from its adversarial noise. In
2Let’s define adversarial samples as those that cause at least a
20% (arbitrarily chosen) drop in accuracy
Algorithm 1 Cleaning Adversarial Inputs
Input: adversarial input x, learning rate η
Sample z0 from noise prior pz(z)
for i = 1 to m do
Update zi ← zi−1 − η∇zL(zi−1)
end for
return G(zm), the cleaned image
order to do so, Pouya Samangouei (2018) and similar work
suggest to find an optimal L2-reconstruction of x by G:
z∗ = argmin
z
‖ G(z)− x ‖22 . (2)
However, these approaches use only the generator G of the
GAN.
As already argued in the previous sections, the discrim-
inator D contains important information about the data
manifold. How can we exploit this information in or-
der to improve reconstruction? The probability that a re-
constructed input G(z) lies on the data manifold can be
modelled by D as D(G(z)), whose log-likelihood is then
log(D(G(z))). Moreover, it is natural to interpret a re-
scaled L2-reconstruction term 12σ2 ‖G(z)− x‖22 as the neg-
ative log-likelihood of an isotropic Gaussian of variance
σ2 centered at x, since the logarithm and the exponential
cancel. A desired reconstruction term would aim at maxi-
mizing the likelihood that G(z) be close to x, while lying
on the data manifold. If we model these two events as being
independent and having probability densities respectively
N (x, σ2In) and D(G(z)) − where σ is a hyper-parameter
of the model −, then this leads us to maximizing the follow-
ing log-likelihood:
log
(
1
(2piσ2)n/2
e−
1
2σ2
‖G(z)−x‖22
)
+ log(D(G(z))), (3)
which is strictly equivalent to minimizing the following
quantity:
L(z) := 1
2σ2
‖G(z)− x‖22 − log(D(G(z))). (4)
Note that σ trades-off between exact reconstruction (G(z) =
x) and realness of the reconstruction (D(G(z)) = 1).
We can now find a minimizer z∗ ofL by gradient-descent, as
in Pouya Samangouei (2018), while keeping the generator
and the discriminator fixed. We experiment with different
values of σ and discuss its effect in 4.2. The two terms
composing our reconstruction loss L ensure that the cleaned
image is similar to the input and lies on the data manifold,
which is achieved without evaluating any likelihood over
pdata explicitly.
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Table 1. Classifier Accuracies (5,000 cleaning steps): The classifier accuracy on the adversarial samples increases significantly when the
samples have been preprocessed with the Cowboy cleaning method.
ATTACK MNIST F-MNIST CIFAR-10 SVHN
Original Adv Clean Original Adv Clean Original Adv Clean Original Adv Clean
FGSM (l∞) 0.97 0.12 0.78 0.89 0.11 0.44 0.78 0.30 0.53 0.87 0.34 0.72
PGDM (l∞) 0.97 0.02 0.81 0.89 0.07 0.48 0.78 0.06 0.53 0.87 0.13 0.60
BIM (l∞) 0.97 0.02 0.15 0.89 0.07 0.13 0.78 0.20 0.47 0.87 0.16 0.49
MIM (l∞) 0.97 0.03 0.45 0.89 0.08 0.32 0.78 0.21 0.43 0.87 0.15 0.48
VAM 0.97 0.32 0.43 0.89 0.50 0.34 0.78 0.45 0.56 0.87 0.67 0.76
4. Experiments
Experimental Setup. We conduct experiments on
MNIST, Fashion-MNIST (Xiao et al., 2017), CIFAR-10
and SVHN. We use the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM),
Basic Iterative Method (BIM), Virtual Adversary Method
(VAM), Projected Gradient Descent Method (PGDM) and
Momentum Iterative Method (MIM) to mount attacks on
the classifier.
The classifier is a simple CNN and the GAN is based on
the DCGAN family of architectures (Radford et al., 2015).
Batch Normalization (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015) and Dropout
(Srivastava et al., 2014) are used only for the classifier. The
weights are initialized using the Xavier Initializer (Glorot
& Bengio, 2010). Other than normalizing the inputs to lie
between -1 and 1, no special pre- or post-processing steps
are performed. The models are implemented in TensorFlow
(Abadi et al., 2016) and the implementations of the adversar-
ial attacks are based on CleverHans (Papernot et al., 2017)3.
Both the classifier and the GAN for SVHN and CIFAR-10
are trained for 40K steps, whereas the ones for MNIST and
Fashion-MNIST are trained for 2K steps. Once training is
complete, we test on the entire respective test sets. Further
details on the hyperparameters along with the specific archi-
tectures can be found in the codebase and supplementary
material.
Results on Detection of Adversarial Samples. We now
directly test the hypothesis that the scores the discrimina-
tor assigns to samples are meaningful and can be utilized
for the detection of adversarially perturbed images. Fig-
ure 3 shows the discriminator distribution of these scores
through violin plots for the different datasets and attack
methods, respectively. Note that adversarial samples that
do not cause miss-classification are included as well. The
trend of consistently assigning higher scores to unmodified
samples and lower scores to adversarial inputs is seen across
all settings. Furthermore, we find that the score assigned
by the discriminator to adversarial samples correlates to the
severeness of the attack, i.e. attacks that cause larger de-
3codebase will be released after the review process
crease in the classification accuracy tend to be scored lower
by the discriminator.4
For CIFAR-10 it is noticeable that some of the real images
are assigned a low score by the discriminator. A randomly
sampled batch of those is shown in Figure 4. As can be seen,
the images tend to contain patches and unnatural artifacts.
Despite the fact that the GAN has only been trained on
the real samples, and adversarial samples generated with a
specific technique are never shown to the discriminator, it is
capable of detecting adversarial perturbations irrespective
of the attack method and dataset. This suggests that the
discriminator behaves favorably in terms of ability to detect
and distinguish adversarial samples.
Results on Cleaning Adversarial Samples. Once de-
tected, the adversarial samples can in theory be cleaned by
removing the perturbation such that the purified sample is as-
signed to the correct class when passed to the target classifier.
Table 1 gives the classification accuracy on: (i) the entire
test set, (ii) the adversarially perturbed samples and (iii) the
cleaned samples. When used as a preprocessing procedure,
the cleaning method significantly improves the classifier
accuracy on the adversarial samples. The method general-
izes well as reflected by the improved accuracy across the
various dataset and attack method combinations.
Figure 5 showcases adversarially modified samples from
CIFAR-10 and how they look like after our cleaning proce-
dure has been applied.
In the following we investigate how specific aspects of the
algorithm affect the results.
4.1. Effect of the quality of the trained GAN
Since we use different parts of a GAN to detect and clean
adversarial samples, it is only natural that the quality of the
GAN itself may influence the performance of these methods.
4The severeness of the attack can be seen in Table 1 by com-
paring the accuracy of the classifier on the clean samples versus
the accuracy of the classifier after applying the adversarial pertur-
bations.
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(a) MNIST (b) Fashion-MNIST
(c) CIFAR-10 (d) SVHN
Figure 3. Distribution of the discriminator scores for different datasets. The violin denoted by real shows the discriminator scores on
the validation set. The others show the scores of the discriminator after adding the perturbation to the images. As a result of the added
perturbation, the images are pushed out of the data manifold and assigned a lower score. Note that not all perturbations lead to a successful
adversarial sample, where successfulness is measured by the ability to cause miss-classification when using the target classifier.
Figure 6 shows the classification accuracy where the dis-
criminator and generator used for the cleaning procedure are
trained for increasing number of training steps. As expected,
we observe that as the GAN approaches convergence, the
general trend of the performance quality increases. It can
also be observed that the trends are not smooth, which can
be attributed to the unstable nature of the GAN training.
On the other hand, the performance of the detection mech-
anism of cowboy is not influenced as much by the quality
of the GAN, as shown in Figure 7. Even when the GAN
is not fully trained, it assigns lower scores to adversarial in
comparison to real samples, and hence, is able to detect the
former.
4.2. The Effect of The Two Terms
In Section 3, we argue that both the reconstruction term
and the discriminator score of the cleaning objective are
important for better purification of the adversarial samples.
Table 2 gives the comparison to Defense-GAN, a cleaning
algorithm that is based only on the generator of the GAN.
The results empirically justify the usefulness of the discrim-
inator score in terms of pushing the adversarial samples on
the data manifold.
4.3. Summary
For all the experiments, we use the standard GAN training
procedure, without hyperparameter tuning and additional
tricks for stabilizing the training (e.g. adding noise or reg-
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Table 2. Defense-GAN vs. Cowboy (5000 cleaning steps): Classifier accuracy on adversarial samples cleaned with each of the two
methods. Cowboy consistently gives better results by the additional utilization of the discriminator score.
ATTACK MNIST F-MNIST CIFAR-10 SVHN
Defense-GAN Cowboy Defense-GAN Cowboy Defense-GAN Cowboy Defense-GAN Cowboy
FGSM (l∞) 0.74 0.78 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.53 0.67 0.72
PGDM (l∞) 0.74 0.81 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.53 0.58 0.60
BIM (l∞) 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.38 0.47 0.49 0.49
MIM (l∞) 0.32 0.45 0.27 0.32 0.35 0.43 0.44 0.48
VAM 0.34 0.43 0.32 0.34 0.45 0.56 0.70 0.76
Figure 4. Randomly sampled images from the validation set of
Cifar-10 for which the discriminator assigns low scores.
ularizing (Roth et al., 2017), or using a more sophisticated
GAN training and architecture, such as BEGAN (Berthelot
et al., 2017)). Even so, after training the GAN on the real
samples, both the generator and discriminator contain useful
information that can be leveraged for the defense against
adversarial attacks.
The discriminator can be effectively used as a tool for de-
tection of adversarial samples, whereas the combination of
both the generator and discriminator constitutes a simple,
yet powerful strategy for cleaning adversarial samples be-
fore their classification. As the method only works as a pre-
processing step, it requires no modification of the training
of the target classifiers, hence making it easily incorporable
to already existing models.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented cowboy, a novel GAN-based
method for successful detection and purification of adver-
sarial samples. The method is based on the hypothesis that
adversarial samples lie outside of the data manifold that is
learned by a Generative Adversarial Network, irrespective
of the underlying attack mechanism. We provide empirical
evidence for this hypothesis and show that the discriminator
acts as a good tool for the detection of adversarially per-
turbed samples. The defense strategy is based on projecting
the detected adversarial samples back to the data manifold
in order to clean the adversarial noise. Various experiments
show the effectiveness and the generalization of the method
across different attacks and datasets.
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(a) Real samples (b) Adversarially perturbed samples (c) Cleaned adversarial samples
Figure 5. Here we show a few images from CIFAR-10 (a), then a few adversarial attacks performed on these images (b), and finally what
they look like after cleaning by our proposed method (c).
Figure 6. Effect of GAN quality on adversarial sample cleaning
(FGSM (l∞) on SVHN): The classifier accuracy improves as the
training of the GAN progresses. Different colors represent results
for different number of cleaning steps.
Figure 7. Effect of GAN quality on adversarial sample detection
(FGSM (l∞) on SVHN): The average discriminator score for all
the real and adversarial samples is given with the orange and
blue curve, respectively. The discriminator is able to distinguish
adversarial from real samples even early on throughout the training.
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